2 De feiten
2.1.
In een persbericht heeft de Europese Commissie (hierna: de Commissie) opgenomen dat zij in een besluit van 9 november 2010 heeft geoordeeld dat vanaf december 1999 tot 14 februari 2006 brandstof- en veiligheidstoeslagen zijn gecoördineerd ten aanzien van vluchten van, naar en binnen de Europese Economische Ruimte en Zwitserland, door diverse luchtvaartmaatschappijen. Aan elf luchtvaartmaatschappijen, zo is opgenomen in dat persbericht, zijn geldboetes opgelegd voor een totaalbedrag van
€ 799.445.000,-- voor deelname aan een internationaal kartel.
2.2.
Tegen dit besluit (hierna: het oude besluit) is door alle twintig geadresseerden daarvan, met uitzondering van Quantas Airways Limited, beroep ingesteld bij het Gerecht van de Europese Unie (hierna: het Gerecht). Bij arresten van 16 december 2015 heeft het Gerecht de beroepen gegrond verklaard en het oude besluit van de Commissie (ten aanzien van British Airways Plc. gedeeltelijk) nietig verklaard. De Commissie heeft geen beroep ingesteld tegen deze arresten.
2.3.
British Airways Plc. heeft tegen het oude besluit een hogere voorziening ingesteld bij het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie. Deze procedure loopt nog.
2.4.
In een persbericht heeft de Commissie opgenomen dat zij in een besluit van 17 maart 2017 wederom heeft geoordeeld dat in de hiervoor onder 2.2 genoemde periode sprake was van een internationaal kartel en dat zij aan elf luchtvaartmaatschappijen geldboetes heeft opgelegd voor een totaalbedrag van € 776.465.000,-- voor deelname aan dat kartel (Besluit van de Commissie van 17 maart 2017 betreffende een procedure op grond van artikel 101 van het verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie, artikel 53 van de EER-overeenkomst en artikel 8 van de Overeenkomst tussen de Europese Gemeenschap en de Zwitserse Bondsstaat inzake luchtvervoer (Zaak AT.39258 – Luchtvracht), hierna: het nieuwe besluit). Het nieuwe besluit is nog niet gepubliceerd. Het merendeel van de geadresseerden van het nieuwe besluit was ten tijde van het pleidooi op 11 mei 2017 voornemens om tegen het nieuwe besluit beroep in te stellen bij het Gerecht.
2.5.
Er zijn, zo stelt Equilib, brandstoftoeslagen en andere toeslagen aan de afzenders van goederen die luchtvrachtdiensten hebben afgenomen (ook wel genoemd shippers) in rekening gebracht via expediteurs (ook wel genoemd freight forwarders).
2.6.
Equilib, sinds 18 december 2012 na een fusie de rechtsopvolger onder algemene titel van Equilib S.A.R.L. (een vennootschap naar Frans recht), is een Nederlandse vennootschap die schadevergoedingsvorderingen (die zijn ontstaan door mededingings-rechtelijke inbreuken) in rechte tracht te verhalen (ook wel genoemd een ‘litigation vehicle’ of ‘claim vehicle’), in dit geval de vorderingen die een aantal shippers meent te hebben op de luchtvaartmaatschappijen ter zake van het hiervoor bedoelde kartel.
2.7.
Equilib koopt de vorderingen op, bundelt deze en gaat deze vervolgens in eigen naam innen. Hiertoe laat Equilib haar ‘cliënten’ (shippers) hun (vermeende) vorderingen aan haar cederen. De door Equilib overgelegde cessiedocumentatie betreft:
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i) de cessieovereenkomsten/leveringsakten (“hoofdovereenkomsten”) tussen enerzijds de cedenten (shipper en/of moedermaatschappij van een dochtermaatschappij die als shipper luchtvrachtdiensten heeft afgenomen) en anderzijds Equilib (Assignment of Rights Agreements),
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ii) de overeenkomsten tussen de dochtermaatschappijen, de moedermaatschappijen en Equilib (Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreements),
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iii) de leveringsakten tussen de dochtermaatschappijen en de moedermaatschappijen (Assignments from Subsidiary to Parent),
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iv) de leveringsakten tussen de moedermaatschappijen en Equilib (Assignments from Parent to Equilib),
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v) de cessieovereenkomsten/leveringsakten tussen een aantal shippers en Equilib (Supplementary Assignment of Rights Agreements) waarin de eerdere cessies worden bevestigd en waarbij is beoogd vorderingen uit de periode december 1999 en/of vorderingen uit de periode tussen 15 februari 2006 en eind 2008 over te dragen.
2.8.
Equilib heeft voor de cessiedocumentatie diverse modellen gehanteerd, die hierna, voor zover relevant, zullen worden weergegeven.
Volgens Equilib zijn de verschillende modellen in grote lijnen in te delen in modellen met een ‘oude’ considerans waarin nog werd aangenomen dat het kartel van 2000-2007 duurde. In modellen met een ‘nieuwe’ considerans wordt uitgegaan van een kartel tussen december 1999 en 14 februari 2006. De Supplementary Assignment of Rights Agreements zijn aparte modellen die gebaseerd zijn op de daaraan voorafgaande cessies. Deze zijn ingedeeld afhankelijk van de vraag of de voorgaande cessiedocumentatie een ‘oude’ of ‘nieuwe’ considerans had en of sprake is van dochtermaatschappijen. Ten slotte zijn de meest recente cessies ook in een nieuw model gegoten en aangeduid als het ‘2016-model’ (A5, B5, C5 en D5), aldus steeds Equilib.
2.9.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “A1- Agreement Assignment of Rights oude considerans DEF” tussen de cedent (al dan niet een moedermaatschappij) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Claimant’ of ‘Assignor’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignee’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
“WHEREAS
A. The Commission of the European Communities (…) and several national competition authorities have initiated investigations and/or actual and potential prosecutions against certain major airlines (the “Airlines”) for allegedly having taken part between 2000 and 2007 (the “Cartel Period”) in a cartel which fixed prices, surcharges and levies in relation to international air freight services provided by the Airlines from and to member states of the European Union and other countries (the “Cartel”).
B. The Airlines include but are not limited to: Air France-KLM Airlines, Alitalia, Air Canada, Air New Zealand, All Nippon Airways, Cathay Pacific, Cargolux, Japan Airlines, LAN Airlines, Lufthansa, Malaysian Airlines, Quantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Thai A(i)rways.
C. It is alleged that the Airlines have, by means of the Cartel, artificially inflated their international air freight charges during the Cartel Period in an anticompetitive manner and without any valid legal justification. The amount of the artificial inflation in the charges is referred to as the “Overcharge”.
D. Companies that directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from any of the Airlines during the Cartel Period are likely to have suffered loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and may have one or more claims against the Airlines for compensation.
E. The Claimant directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period and has suffered economic and financial loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge (the “Losses”). The Airlines are jointly and severally liable for the Losses.
F. The Claimant has rights to recover compensation for the Losses (the “Rights”) against all or any of the Airlines which have partaken in the Cartel in breach of competition law. Depending upon where, when and how the Losses were incurred, these Rights may be of different nature, legal status and time limitations.
G. In addition to the Rights, the Claimant enjoys all rights accessory to or otherwise necessary for the effective resolution and enforcement of the Rights, including the right to
bring legal proceedings for damages in an appropriate jurisdiction against all or any of the Airlines, the right to settle or compromise the Rights in negotiation with all or any of the Airlines and the right to be paid damages, settlement monies, interest, costs and all other forms of monetary compensation whatsoever which may be payable or recoverable in respect of the Rights (the “Accessory Rights”).
H. The Claimant whishes to assign the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Assignment”) to Equilib on the terms and conditions of this Agreement, in order for Equilib to resolve the Rights through either an action for damages or a settlement. Equilib will, subject to the terms of this Agreement, bear all the costs and risks of resolving and enforcing the Rights assigned to it. In consideration for the Assignment, Equilib undertakes to pay to the Claimant a share of any payment that may be made by the Airlines to Equilib in relation to
the Rights.
(…)
2.
Assignment of the Rights and the Accessory Rights
2.1
The Assignor hereby assigns and transfers, in full, the Rights and all of the Accessory Rights to the Assignee on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
2.2
The Assignee hereby acquires the complete ownership and possession of the Rights and the Accessory Rights. The Assignee may henceforth exercise the Rights and the Accessory Rights in its own name, at its own expense and risk, free from any restriction or interference by the Assignor.
2.3
The Assignee shall at its expense, where legally required, make the appropriate notification of the existence and terms of this Assignment to such of the Airlines as the Assignee wishes to resolve or enforce the Rights against.
3.
Price of the Assignment
3.1
In consideration for the Assignment, the Assignor will be entitled to a Price equivalent to (…) of the Compensation (…).
3.3
The Assignor acknowledges that the quantum and payment of the Price depends entirely on the Assignee successfully resolving and enforcing the Rights for value through Proceedings or Alternative Resolution.
(…)
8.
Buy-Back Option
8.1
With respect to the Rights, should the Assignee within the Performance Period;
( a) fail to commence Proceedings or seek Alternative Resolution (clause 4.2);
( b) decide not to seek to resolve or enforce the Rights following a Negative Opinion notified to the Assignor (clause 4.3); or
( c) cause an event of Default as provided for under clause 4.8;
the Assignor will be granted by the Assignee the right to call back the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Buy-Back Option”) in accordance with clause 8.2 below.
(…)
12.
Governing law and jurisdiction
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.10.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “A2- Agreement Assignment of Rights nieuwe considerans DEF” tussen de cedent (al dan niet een moedermaatschappij) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Claimant’ of ‘Assignor’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignee’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
“WHEREAS
A. On the 9ͭ ͪ November 2010 the Commission of the European Communities (the “EC”) announced that it had completed investigations into a worldwide cartel (“the Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”). 14 airlines (the “Airlines”) were found to have illegally fixed fuel and security surcharges on all shipments and the EC imposed fines totalling €799m.
B. The airlines are Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
C. The Airlines have, by means of the Cartel, artificially inflated their international air freight charges during the Cartel Period in an anticompetitive manner and without any valid legal justification. The amount of the artificial inflation in the charges is referred to as the “Overcharge”.
D. Companies that directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from any of the Airlines during the Cartel Period are likely to have suffered loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and may have one or more claims agains the Airlines for compensation.
E. The Claimant directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period or have paid fuel and/or security surcharges during the Cartel Period and has suffered economic and financial loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge (the “Losses”). The Airlines are jointly and severally liable for the Losses.
F. The Claimant has rights to recover compensation for the Losses (the “Rights”) against all or any of the Airlines which have partaken in the Cartel in breach of competition law. Depending upon where, when and how the Losses were incurred, these Rights may be of different nature, legal status and time limitations.
G. In addition to the Rights, the Claimant enjoys all rights accessory to or otherwise necessary for the effective resolution and enforcement of the Rights, including the right to
bring legal proceedings for damages in an appropriate jurisdiction against all or any of the Airlines, the right to settle or compromise the Rights in negotiation with all or any of the Airlines and the right to be paid damages, settlement monies, interest, costs and all other forms of monetary compensation whatsoever which may be payable or recoverable in respect of the Rights (the “Accessory Rights”).
H. The Claimant whishes to assign the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Assignment”) to Equilib on the terms and conditions of this Agreement, in order for Equilib to resolve the Rights through either an action for damages or a settlement. Equilib will, subject to the terms of this Agreement, bear all the costs and risks of resolving and enforcing the Rights assigned to it. In consideration for the Assignment, Equilib undertakes to pay to the Claimant a share of any payment that may be made by the Airlines to Equilib in relation to
the Rights.
(…)
2.
Assignment of the Rights and the Accessory Rights
2.1
The Assignor hereby assigns and transfers, in full, the Rights and all of the Accessory Rights to the Assignee on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
2.2
The Assignee hereby acquires the complete ownership and possession of the Rights and the Accessory Rights. The Assignee may henceforth exercise the Rights and the Accessory Rights in its own name, at its own expense and risk, free from any restriction or interference by the Assignor.
2.3
The Assignee shall at its expense, where legally required, make the appropriate notification of the existence and terms of this Assignment to such of the Airlines as the Assignee wishes to resolve or enforce the Rights against.
3.
Price of the Assignment
3.1
In consideration for the Assignment, the Assignor will be entitled to a Price equivalent to (…) of the Compensation (…).
3.3
The Assignor acknowledges that the quantum and payment of the Price depends entirely on the Assignee successfully resolving and enforcing the Rights for value through Proceedings or Alternative Resolution.
(…)
8.
Buy-Back Option
8.1
With respect to the Rights, should the Assignee;
( a) decide not to seek to resolve or enforce the Rights following a Negative Opinion notified to the Assignor (clause 4.1); or
( b) cause an event of Default as provided for under clause 4.5;
the Assignor will be granted by the Assignee the right to call back the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Buy-Back Option”) in accordance with clause 8.2 below.
(…)
12.
Governing law and jurisdiction
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.11.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “A5- Agreement Assignment of Rights 2016-model DEF” tussen de cedent (al dan niet een moedermaatschappij) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Claimant’ of ‘Assignor’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignee’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
“WHEREAS
A. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14th February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding 14 Airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (the “Cartel Conduct”). (…)
B. The Airlines are: Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines. (…)
C. The Airlines have, by means of the Cartel, artificially inflated their international air freight charges during the Cartel Period in an anticompetitive manner and without any valid legal justification. The amount of the artificial inflation in the charges is referred to as the “Overcharge”.
D. Companies that directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from any of the Airlines during the Cartel Period are likely to have suffered loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and may have one or more claims agains the Airlines for compensation. The damages for which compensation can be sought include damages incurred as a result of the effects that the Cartel Conduct has had on the conduct and pricing policy of other airlines that were not a member of the Cartel (“Umbrella Effects”).
E. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surcharges from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”).
F. The Claimant directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from one or more of the Airlines and other airlines during the Cartel Period and the Post-Cartel Period and has suffered economic and financial loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and the Umbrella Effects (the “Losses”). The Airlines are jointly and severally liable for the Losses.
G. The Claimant has rights to recover compensation for the Losses (the “Rights”) against all or any of the Airlines which have partaken in the Cartel in breach of competition law. The Rights may differ including in respect of applicable law, their legal status and the applicable limitation periods.
H. In addition to the Rights, the Claimant enjoys all rights accessory to or otherwise necessary for the effective resolution and enforcement of the Rights, including the right to
bring legal proceedings for damages in an appropriate jurisdiction against all or any of the Airlines, the right to settle or compromise the Rights in negotiation with all or any of the Airlines and the right to be paid damages, settlement monies, interest, costs and all other forms of compensation whatsoever which may be payable or recoverable in respect of the Rights (the “Accessory Rights”). (…)
I. The Claimant whishes to sell and assign the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Assignment”) to Equilib on the terms and conditions of this Agreement, in order for Equilib to resolve the Rights through either an action for damages or a settlement. Equilib will, subject to the terms of this Agreement, bear all the costs and risks of resolving and enforcing the Rights assigned to it. In consideration for the Assignment, Equilib undertakes to pay to the Claimant a share of any payment that may be made by the Airlines to Equilib in relation to the Rights.
(…)
2.
Assignment of the Rights and the Accessory Rights
2.1
The Assignor hereby assigns and transfers, in full, the Rights and all of the Accessory Rights to the Assignee on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
2.2
The Assignee hereby acquires the complete ownership and possession of the Rights and the Accessory Rights. The Assignee may henceforth exercise the Rights and the Accessory Rights in its own name, at its own expense and risk, free from any restriction or interference by the Assignor.
2.3
The Assignee shall at its expense, where legally required, make the appropriate notification of the existence and terms of this Assignment to such of the Airlines as the Assignee wishes to resolve or enforce the Rights and the Accessory Rights against.
3.
Price of the Assignment
3.1
In consideration for the Assignment, the Assignor will be entitled to a Price equivalent to (…) of the Compensation (…).
3.3
The Assignor acknowledges that the quantum and payment of the Price depends entirely on the Assignee successfully resolving and enforcing the Rights and the Accessory Rights for value through Proceedings or Alternative Resolution.
(…)
8.
Buy-Back Option
8.1
With respect to the Rights and the Accessory Rights, should the Assignee;
( a) decide not to seek to resolve or enforce the Rights and the Accessory Rights or continue to do so following a Negative Opinion notified to the Assignor (clause 4.1); or
( b) cause an event of Default as provided for under clause 4.5;
the Assignor will be granted by the Assignee the right to call back the Rights and the Accessory Rights (the “Buy-Back Option”) in accordance with clause 8.2 below.
(…)
12.
Governing law and jurisdiction
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.12.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “B1- Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreement oude considerans DEF”, gesloten tussen Equilib, de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en de dochtermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary’), luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. The European Commission is investigating alleged cartel behaviour by various airlines believed to have occurred between 1ˢᵗ January 2000 – 14ͭ ͪ February 2007 (“the Cartel Period”) which affected competition within the European Union. The above airlines (“the Airlines”) are believed to include, but are not limited to KLM, Martinair, British Airways, Air France, Asiana, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific, El Al, Japan Air Lines, Korean Airlines, LAN Carco, Aerolinhas Brasileiras, Nippon Cargo Airlines, Qantas, SAS and Lufthansa.
b. The alleged cartel behaviour relates to air cargo services and the fixing of various so-called surcharges between competitors (“the Cartel Conduct”). If proven, this conduct would infringe Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
c. Subsidiary has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo transportation services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period, and thus, as a result of the Cartel Conduct, has incurred damages, for which the Subsidiary holds the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable (“the Subsidiary’s Claims”);
d. Parent and Equilib have entered into an agreement, concluded on (…), which provides inter alia for Parent to assign (cederen) claims of its own similar to the Subsidiary’s Claims (“the Parent’s Claims”) to Equilib;
e. Parent and Equilib wish to include in the Parent’s Claims the Subsidiary’s Claims and Subsidiary therefore agrees to assign the Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent;
f. Subsidiary grants Equilib a mandate (“last”) under Articles 7:414 (…) Dutch Civil Code to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims.
g. This agreement is governed by Dutch law; for this reason Subsidiary as assignor and Parent as assignee will assign by separate deed the Subsidiary’s Claims in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code;
SUBSIDIARY, PARENT AND EQUILIB COVENANT AS FOLLOWS
1. Subsidiary will assign to Parent by separate deed the Subsidiary’s Claims against the Airlines.
2. Subsidiary mandates Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 (…) Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.”
2.13.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “B2 Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreement nieuwe considerans DEF”, gesloten tussen Equilib, de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en de dochtermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary’), bevat dezelfde bepalingen als het onder 2.12 genoemde model, behoudens onder a en b, welke als volgt luiden:
“a. The European Commission has completed its investigation into a worldwide cartel (“the Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (“the Cartel Period”) finding the Airlines guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”).
b. This conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused.”
2.14.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “B5 Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreement 2016-model DEF”, gesloten tussen Equilib., de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en de dochtermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary’), luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
“WHEREAS:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14th February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding 14 Airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines are: Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines. (…)
c. The Airlines have, by means of the Cartel, artificially inflated their international air freight charges during the Cartel Period in an anticompetitive manner and without any valid legal justification. The amount of the artificial inflation in the charges is referred to as the “Overcharge”.
d. Companies that directly and/or indirectly purchased international air freight services from any of the Airlines during the Cartel Period are likely to have suffered loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and may have one or more claims agains the Airlines for compensation. The damages for which compensation can be sought include damages incurred as a result of the effects that the Cartel Conduct has had on the conduct and pricing policy of other airlines that were not a member of the cartel (“Umbrella Effects”).
e. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surcharges from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”).
f. Subsidiary has directly and/or indirectly purchased air freight services from one or more of the Airlines and other airlines during the Cartel Period and the Post-Cartel Period and have suffered economic and financial loss and damage as a result of the Overcharge and the Umbrella Effects (the “Losses”). The Airlines are jointly and severally liable for the Losses.
g. The Subsidiary has rights to recover compensation for the Losses (the “Rights”) against all or any of the Airlines which have partaken in the Carel in breach of competition law. The Rights may differ including in respect of applicable law, their legal status and the applicable limitation periods.
h. In addition to the Rights, the Subsidiary enjoys all rights accessory to or otherwise necessary for the effective resolution and enforcement of the Rights, including the right to bring legal proceedings for damages in an appriopriate jurisdiction against all or any of the Airlines, the right to settle or compromise the Rights in negotation with all or any of the Airlines and the right to be paid damages, settlement monies, interest, costs and all other forms of compensation whatsoever which may be payable or recoverable in respect of the Rights (the “Accessory Rights”). The Rights and the Accessory Rights are hereinafter together referred to as the “Subsidiary’s Claims”.
i. Parent and Equilib have entered into an agreement, concluded on (…), which provides inter alia for Parent to sell and assign (cederen) claims of its own similar to the Subsidiary’s Claims (“the Parent’s Claims”) to Equilib; that same agreement contains the actual assignment of the Parent’s Claims to Equilib;
j. Subsidiary hereby wishes to agree to sell and assign the Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent and Parent hereby wishes to agree to subsequently sell and reassign (doorcederen) these claims to Equilib. Equilib wishes to agree to acquire these claims and accept the assignment thereof. (…)
k. Subsidiary, insofar as necessary, grants Equilib a mandate (“last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims.
l. This agreement is governed by Dutch law; for this reason Subsidiary as assignor and Parent as assignee will assign by separate deed the Subsidiary’s Claims in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code;
SUBSIDIARY, PARENT AND EQUILIB COVENANT AS FOLLOWS
1. Subsidiary and Parent agree that Subsidiary will sell and assign to Parent by
separate deed the Subsidiary’s Claims against the Airlines.
2. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent will sell and reassign to Equilib by separate
deed the Subsidiary’s Claims against the Airlines. (…)
4. Subsidiary, insofar as necessary, hereby mandates Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.”
2.15.
In het door Equilib overgelegde model “C1 - Assignment from Subsidiary to Parent oude considerans DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij en de moedermaatschappij staat vermeld, voor zover hier relevant:
“Dear [PARENT],
Pursuant to our agreement, concluded on [DATE INTRAGROUP ASSIGNMENT & MANDATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED…..], providing for the reassigning (doorcederen) of our claims (“the Claims”) by you to Equilib, we hereby assign (cederen) to you our Claims against certain airlines which are believed to include, but are not limited to KLM, Martinair, British Airways, Air France, Asiana, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific, El Al, Japan Air Lines, Korean Airlines, LAN Cargo, Aerolinhas Brasileiras, Nippon Cargo Airlines, Qantas, SAS and Lufthansa (“the Airlines”).
If you are required to notify the Airlines of this assignment you may do so by giving them a copy of this letter which summaries the background to the assignments as follows:
a. The European Commission is investigating alleged cartel behaviour by the Airlines believed to have occurred between 1ˢͭ January 2000 – 14ͭ ͪ Februari 2007 (“the Cartel Period”) which affected competition within the European Union.
b. The alleged cartel behaviour relates to air cargo services and the fixing of various so-called surcharges between competitors (“the Cartel Conduct”). If proven, this conduct would infringe Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
c. We have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo transportation services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period, and thus, as a result of the Cartel Conduct, have incurred damages, for which we hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable by means of the Claims.
d. We have assigned (gecedeerd) to you our Claims concerning the aforementioned damages.
e. Our agreement mentioned above is governed by Dutch law; for this reason the present assignment occurs in accordance with Dutch law. (…)”.
2.16.
In het door Equilib overgelegde model “C2 - Assignment from Subsidiary to Parent nieuwe considerans DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij en de moedermaatschappij staat vermeld, voor zover hier relevant:
“Dear Parent,
Pursuant to our agreement, concluded on [DATE INTRAGROUP ASSIGNMENT & MANDATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED…..], providing for the reassigning (doorcederen) of our claims (“the Claims”) by you to Equilib Netherlands B.V., we hereby assign (cederen) to you our Claims against certain airlines which are believed to include, but are not limited to Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines. (“the Airlines”).
If you are required to notify the Airlines of this assignment you may do so by giving them a copy of this letter which summaries the background to the assignments as follows:
a. The European Commission has completed its investigations into a worldwide cartel (“the Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding the Airlines guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (the “Cartel Conduct”).
b. This conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused.
c. We have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo transportation services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period, and thus, as a result of the Cartel Conduct, have incurred damages, for which we hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable by means of the Claims.
d. We have assigned (gecedeerd) to you our Claims concerning the aforementioned damages.
e. Our agreement mentioned above is governed by Dutch law; for this reason the present assignment occurs in accordance with Dutch law.”
2.17.
In het door Equilib overgelegde model “C5 - Assignment from Subsidiary to Parent 2016-model DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary’) en de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) staat vermeld, voor zover hier relevant:
a. On [DATE INTRAGROUP ASSIGNMENT & MANDATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED…..], Subsidiary, Parent and Equilib Netherlands B.V. entered into an Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreement;
b. The aforementioned agreement inter alia provides for the sale and assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims (as defined therein) by Subsidiary to Parent and the subsequent sale and reassignment (doorcederen) of the Subsidiary’s Claims by Parent to Equilib Netherlands B.V.
SUBSIDIARY HEREBY ASSIGNS TO PARENT AS FOLLOWS
1. Subsidiary hereby assigns (cederen) to Parent the Subsidiary’s Claims and Parent hereby accepts the assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims.
2. The above agreement between Subsidiary, Parent and Equilib Netherlands B.V. is governed by Dutch law; for this reason this assignment is in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code (…)”.
2.18.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “D1 - Assignment from Parent to Equilib oude considerans DEF” tussen de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignor’ en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignee’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. The European Commission is investigating alleged cartel behaviour by various airlines (“the Airlines”) believed to have occurred between 1ˢͭ January 2000 – 14ͭ ͪ February 2007 (“the Cartel Period”) which affected competition within the European Union. The above airlines are believed to include, but are not limited to KLM, Martinair, British Airways, Air France, Asiana, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific, El Al, Japan Air Lines, Korean Airlines, LAN Cargo, Aerolinhas Brasileiras, Nippon Cargo Airlines, Qantas, SAS and Lufthansa.
b. The alleged cartel behaviour relates to air cargo services and the fixing of various so-called surcharges between competitors (“the Cartel Conduct”). If proven, this conduct would infringe Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
c. The following subsidiaries: (…) have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo transportation services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period, and thus, as a result of the Cartel Conduct, have incurred damages, for which these subsidiaries hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable;
d. The above subsidiaries have assigned (gecedeerd) to Parent Company their claims to the aforementioned damages (“the Subsidiaries’Claims”);
e. Assignor and Assignee have entered into an agreement, concluded on [DATE INTRAGROUP ASSIGNMENT & MANDATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED…..], which provides for Assignor to reassign (doorcederen) the Subsidiaries’ Claims to Assignee;
f. The above agreement between Assignor and Assignee is governed by Dutch law; for this reason Assignor and Assignee will hereby assign the Subsidiaries’s Claims in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code;
ASSIGNOR HEREBY ASSIGNS TO ASSIGNEE AS FOLLOWS:
1. Assignor assigns to Assignee by this deed the Subsidiaries’ Claims against the Airlines.
2. Assignee has the right pursuant to Article 3:94 (i) Dutch Civil Code to notify the Airlines of this assignment.
3. Assignee has the right to provide the Airlines with a copy of this deed to evidence the assignment.”
2.19.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “D2 - Assignment from Parent to Equilib nieuwe considerans DEF” tussen de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignor’ of ‘Parent Company’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignee’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. The European Commission has completed its investigations into a worldwide cartel (“the Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding the Airlines guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (the “Cartel Conduct”).
b. This conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused.
c. The following subsidiaries: (…) have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo transportation services from one or more of the Airlines during the Cartel Period, and thus, as a result of the Cartel Conduct, have incurred damages, for which these subsidiaries hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable;
d. The above subsidiaries have assigned (gecedeerd) to Parent Company their claims to the aforementioned damages (“the Subsidiaries’ Claims”);
e. Assignor and Assignee have entered into an agreement, concluded on [DATE INTRAGROUP ASSIGNMENT & MANDATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED…..], which provides for Assignor to reassign (doorcederen) the Subsidiaries’ Claims to Assignee;
f. The above agreement between Assignor and Assignee is governed by Dutch law; for this reason Assignor and Assignee will hereby assign the Subsidiaries’ Claims in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code;
ASSIGNOR HEREBY ASSIGNS TO ASSIGNEE AS FOLLOWS:
1. Assignor assigns to Assignee by this deed the Subsidiaries’ Claims against the Airlines.
2. Assignee has the right pursuant to Article 3:94 (i) Dutch Civil Code to notify the Airlines of this assignment.
3. Assignee has the right to provide the Airlines with a copy of this deed to evidence the assignment.”
2.20.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “D5- Assignment from Parent to Equilib 2016-model DEF” tussen de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Assignor’ of ‘Parent’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. Parent, Equilib and the following subsidiaries of Parent: (…)
have entered into Intragroup Assignment and Mandate Agreements.
b. The aforementioned agreements (the “Agreements”) inter alia provide for the sale and assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims (as defined therein) by the subsidiaries to Parent and the subsequent sale and reassignment (doorcederen) by Parent to Equilib of the Subsidiary’s Claims.
c. Pursuant to the Agreements the Subsidiaries have assigned their Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent and Parent hereby wishes to reassign (cederen) to Equilib the Subsidiary’s Claims.
PARENT HEREBY ASSIGNS TO EQUILIB AS FOLLOWS:
1. Parent assigns to Equilib by this deed the Subsidiary’s Claims against the Airlines and Equilib hereby accepts the assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims.
2. Assignee has the right pursuant to Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code to notify the Airlines of this assignment.
3. Assignee has the right to provide the Airlines with a copy of this deed to evidence the assignment.
4. The Agreements are governed by Dutch law, for this reason this assignment is in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code (…)”.
2.21.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “E1-Agreement supplementary assignment of rights - 99-06 AR - geen subsidiaries DEF” tussen de cedent (in het model aangeduid als ‘Company’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt als volgt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding 14 Airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines include Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
c. The Cartel Conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused by it.
d. Pursuant tot he Assignment of Rights Agreement, concluded on (…), the Company has assigned claims to Equilib (the “Company’s Claims”).
e. The Company’s Claims form part of proceedings between Equilib and several members of the Cartel before the District Court of Amsterdam in the Netherlands.
f. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surcharges from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”). The Company has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo services in the Post-Cartel Period (for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland), and thus, as a result of the lingering effects of the Cartel Conduct, may have incurred further damages, for which the Company holds the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from the Company vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post-Cartel Company Claims”.
g. The Company has agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Company’s Claims and has also agreed to supplement this by assigning the Post-Cartel Company Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement as mentioned under recital d of this preamble;
h. The Company has agreed to reaffirm the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 (…) Dutch Civil Code, granted by it to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Company’s Claims and to supplement this mandate with the mandate to Equilib to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Company Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings;
(…)
THE COMPANY AND EQUILIB AGREE AS FOLLOWS
Reaffirmations
1. The Company reaffirms the assignment of the Company’s Claims to Equilib.
2. The Company reaffirms (…) the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 (…) Dutch Civil Code, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Company’s Claims.
Post-Cartel claims
Legal title
3. The Company agrees that it assigns the Post-Cartel Company Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement.
Assignments
4. The Company hereby assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims to Equilib.
Mandate and power of attorney
5. The Company hereby mandates Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 (…) Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Company’s Claims and the Post-Cartel Company Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.
Governing law and jurisdiction
6. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.22.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “E2-Agreement supplementary assignment of rights - 99-06 AR - met subsidiaries DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij(en) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary/Subsidiaries’), de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding 14 airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines include Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
c. The Cartel Conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused by it.
d. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have already assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims (as defined in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement, concluded on (…)) to Parent.
e. Pursuant to the Assignment from Parent to Equilib, concluded on (…), the Parent has (re)assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib.
f. Pursuant to the Assignment of Rights Agreement, concluded on (…), the Parent has assigned its own claims similar to the Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib (the “Parent’s Claims”).
g. The Subsidiary’s Claims and the Parent’s Claims form part of proceedings between Equilib and several members of the Cartel before the District Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
h. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surchages from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”). Parent and Subsidiary/Subsidiaries have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo services in the Post-Cartel Period (for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA), and thus, as a result of the lingering effects of the Cartel Conduct, may have incurred further damages, for which the Parent and the Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Parent vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims”. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims”.
i. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent have agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent and have also agreed to supplement this assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims with the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement mentioned under recital d of this preamble.
j. Parent and Equilib have agreed to reaffirm the previous reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Parent to Equilib and have also agreed to supplement this reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims with the reassignment of Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of this preamble;
k. Parent and Equilib have agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib and have also agreed to supplement this assignment of the Parent’s Claims with the assignment of het Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement as mentioned under recital f of this preamble;
l. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have agreed to reaffirm the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims and to supplement this mandate with the mandate to Equilib to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings;
m. This agreement (the “Agreement”) is governed by Dutch law; for this reason all assignments laid down in this Agreement are in accordance with Dutch law, more specifically in accordance with Article 3:94 (1) Dutch Civil Code;
SUBSIDIARY/SUBSIDIARIES, PARENT AND EQUILIB AGREE AS FOLLOWS
Reaffirmations
1. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent reaffirm the assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent.
2. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Parent to Equilib.
3. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib.
4. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries reaffirm(s) the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims
Post-Cartel claims
Legal title
5. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent agree that Subsidiary/Subsidiaries assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement;
6. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent reassigns the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of the preamble to this Agreement.
7. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement mentioned under recital f of the preamble to this Agreement.
(Re)assignments
8. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hereby assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent.
9. Parent acknowledges the assignment of the Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims under Article 8 and hereby reassigns the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib.
10. Parent hereby assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims to Equilib.
Mandate and power of attorney
11. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent hereby mandate Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.
Governing law and jurisdiction
12. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.23.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “E3-Agreement supplementary assignment of rights - 00-07 AR - geen subsidiaries DEF” tussen de cedent (in het model aangeduid als ‘Company’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (the “Cartel Period”) finding 14 airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (the “Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines include Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
c. The Cartel Conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused by it.
d. Pursuant to the Assignment of Rights Agreement, concluded on (…), the Company has assigned claims to Equilib for damages suffered in de period 2000-2007 as a result of the participation by the Airlines in the Cartel (the “Company’s Claims”).
e. The Company’s Claims form part of proceedings between Equilib and several members of the Cartel before the District Court of Amsterdam in the Netherlands.
f. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surchages from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”). The Company has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo services in the Post-Cartel Period (for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland), and thus, as a result of the lingering effects of the Cartel Conduct, may have incurred further damages, for which the Company holds the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from the Company vis-à-vis the Airlines in 2008 are hereinafter referred to as the “Post-Cartel Company Claims”.
g. The Company has agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Company’s Claims and has also agreed to supplement this by assigning the Post-Cartel Company Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement as mentioned under recital d of this preamble;
h. The Company has also agreed to supplement the previous assignment of the Company’s Claims by assigning claims arising out of air cargo services it has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in December 1999 for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (“December 1999 Company Claims”);
i. The Company also provides a mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to Equilib to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Company’s Claims and to supplement this mandate with the mandate to Equilib to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Company Claims and the December 1999 Company Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings;
(…)
THE COMPANY AND EQUILIB AGREE AS FOLLOWS
Reaffirmation
1. The Company reaffirms the assignment of the Company’s Claims to Equilib.
Post-Cartel Company And December 1999 Claims
Legal title
2. The Company agrees that it assigns the Post-Cartel Company Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement.
3. The Company agrees that it assigns the December 1999 Company Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement.
Assignments
4. The Company hereby assigns the Post-Cartel Company Claims to Equilib.
5. The Company hereby assigns the December 1999 Claims to Equilib.
Mandate
1. The Company hereby mandates Equilib pursuant to Article 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Company Claims and the December 1999 Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.
Governing law and jurisdiction
2. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.24.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “E4 - Agreement supplementary assignment of rights - 00-07 AR - met subsidiaries DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij(en) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary/Subsidiaries’), de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt, voor zover hier relevant:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (“the Cartel Period”) finding 14 airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines include Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
c. The Cartel Conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused by it.
d. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have already assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims (as defined in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement, concluded on (…)) to Parent for damages suffered in the period 2000-2007 as a result of the participation by the Airlines in the Cartel.
e. Pursuant to the Assignment from Parent to Equilib, concluded on (…), the Parent has (re)assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib.
f. Pursuant to the Assignment of Rights Agreement, concluded on (…), the Parent has assigned its own claims similar to the Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib (the “Parent’s Claims”).
g. The Subsidiary’s Claims and the Parent’s Claims form part of proceedings between Equilib and several members of the Cartel before the District Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
h. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surchages from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”). Parent and Subsidiary/Subsidiaries have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo services in the Post-Cartel Period (for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA), and thus, as a result of the lingering effects of the Cartel Conduct, may have incurred further damages, for which the Parent and Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hold the Airlines both individually, and jointly and severally liable. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Parent vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims”. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims”.
i. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent have agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent and have also agreed to supplement this assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims with the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement as mentioned under recital d of this preamble.
j. The Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have also agreed to supplement the previous assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims by assigning to the Parent claims arising out of air cargo services directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in December 1999 by the Subsidiary/Subsidiaries on inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (“December 1999 Subsidiary Claims”);
k. Parent and Equilib have agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Parent to Equilib and have also agreed to supplement this with the reassignment of the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of this preamble;
l. The Parent and Equilib have also agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib and to supplement the previous assignment of the Parent’s Claims with the assignment of het Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the claims arising out of air cargo services it has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in December 1999 for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (“December 1999 Parent Claims”), taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement as mentioned under recital f of this preamble;
m. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have agreed to reaffirm the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims and to supplement this mandate with the mandate to Equilib to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings; (…)
SUBSIDIARY’S/SUBSIDIARIES, PARENT AND EQUILIB AGREE AS FOLLOWS
Reaffirmations
1. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent reaffirm the assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent.
2. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Parent to Equilib.
3. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib.
4. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries reaffirm(s) the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims.
Post-Cartel And December 1999 Claims
Legal title
5. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent agree that Subsidiary/Subsidiaries assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Parent, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement;
6. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent reassigns the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of the preamble to this Agreement.
7. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the December 1999 Parent’s Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement mentioned under recital f of the preamble to this Agreement.
(Re)assignments
8. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hereby assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Parent.
9. Parent acknowledges the assignment of the Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims and hereby reassigns the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Equilib.
10. Parent hereby assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the December 1999 Parent Claims to Equilib.
Mandate
11. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent hereby mandate Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary Claims, the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims, the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the December 1999 Parent Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.
Governing law and jurisdiction
12. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.25.
Het door Equilib overgelegde model “E5 - Agreement supplementary assignment of rights - 00-07 AR - subsidiaries met 99-06 DEF” tussen de dochtermaatschappij(en) (in het model aangeduid als ‘Subsidiary/Subsidiaries’), de moedermaatschappij (in het model aangeduid als ‘Parent’) en Equilib (in het model aangeduid als ‘Equilib’) luidt als volgt:
a. On 9 November 2010 the European Commission announced that it had rendered a decision that day (the “Decision”) in respect of a cartel (the “Cartel”) affecting air cargo services within the European Economic Area between December 1999 and the 14ͭ ͪ February 2006 (“the Cartel Period”) finding 14 airlines (the “Airlines”) guilty of illegal fixing of fuel and security surcharges (“the Cartel Conduct”). (…)
b. The Airlines include Air Canada, Air France, British Airways, Cargolux, Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Swiss International Air Lines.
c. The Cartel Conduct infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and entitles companies affected to claim damages for the harm caused by it.
d. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have already assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims (as defined in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement, concluded on (…)) to Parent.
e. Pursuant to the Assignment from Parent to Equilib, concluded on (…), the Parent has (re)assigned the Subsidiary’s Claims to Equilib, with the exception of claims for damages arising out of air cargo services directly of indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in December 1999 by the Subsidiary/Subsidiaries on inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (“December 1999 Subsidiary Claims”).
f. Pursuant to the Assignment of Rights Agreement, concluded on (…), the Parent has assigned its own claims for damages arising out of air cargo services directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in the period 2000-2007 by the Parent on inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (the “Parent’s Claims”).
g. The Subsidiary’s Claims with the exception of the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims and the Parent’s Claims form part of proceedings between Equilib and several members of the Cartel before the District Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
h. Recent (preliminary) studies offer strong indications that the Cartel Conduct has caused further damage after the Cartel Period, through lingering effects in respect of the surchages from 15 February 2006 to the end of 2008 (the “Post-Cartel Period”). Parent and Subsidiary/Subsidiaries have directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased air cargo services in the Post-Cartel Period (for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA), and thus, as a result of the lingering effects of the Cartel Conduct, may have incurred further damages, for which the Parent and the Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hold the Airlines both individually and jointly and severally liable. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Parent vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims”. Any Post-Cartel Period claims from Subsidiary’s/Subsidiaries vis-à-vis the Airlines are hereinafter referred to as the “Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims”.
i. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent have agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent and have also agreed to supplement this by assigning the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement mentioned under recital d of this preamble;
j. Parent and Equilib have agreed to reaffirm the previous reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims with the exception of the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims from Parent to Equilib and have also agreed to supplement this with the reassignment of the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims, taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of this preamble;
k. The Parent and Equilib have also agreed to reaffirm the previous assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib and to supplement the previous assignment of the Parent’s Claims with the assignment of het Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims (to the extent not already assigned) and the claims arising out of air cargo services it has directly or indirectly (through freight forwarders) purchased in December 1999 for inbound to, outbound from and internal flights within the EEA and Switzerland (“December 1999 Parent Claims”), taking into account the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement as mentioned under recital f of this preamble;
l. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries has/have agreed to reaffirm the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims and to supplement this mandate with the mandate to Equilib to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings;
(…)
SUBSIDIARY/SUBSIDIARIES, PARENT AND EQUILIB AGREE AS FOLLOWS
Reaffirmations
1. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent reaffirm the assignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims from Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Parent.
2. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the reassignment of the Subsidiary’s Claims with the exception of the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims from Parent to Equilib.
3. Parent and Equilib reaffirm the assignment of the Parent’s Claims from Parent to Equilib.
4. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries reaffirm(s) (…) the mandate (“Last”) under Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code, granted by Subsidiary/Subsidiaries to Equilib, to do all that is deemed legally necessary or desirable to find compensation for the Subsidiary’s Claims
Post-Cartel and December 1999 Claims
Legal title
5. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent agree that Subsidiary/Subsidiaries assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims to Parent, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Intragroup Assignment And Mandate Agreement mentioned under recital d of the preamble to this Agreement;
6. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent reassigns the Post-Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment from Parent to Equilib mentioned under recital e of the preamble to this Agreement.
7. Parent and Equilib agree that Parent assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the December 1999 Parent’s Claims to Equilib, on the same terms and conditions as set out in the Assignment of Rights Agreement mentioned under recital f of the preamble to this Agreement.
(Re)assignments
8. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries hereby assign(s) the Post-Cartel Subsidiary Claims to Parent.
9. Parent acknowledges the assignment of the Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and hereby reassigns the Post Cartel Subsidiary’s Claims and the December 1999 Subsidiary Claims to Equilib.
10. Parent hereby assigns the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims (to the extent not already assigned) and the December 1999 Parent Claims to Equilib.
Mandate and power of attorney
11. Subsidiary/Subsidiaries and Parent hereby mandate Equilib pursuant to Articles 7:414 Dutch Civil Code to perform all that is legally necessary or desirable in order to find compensation for the Post-Cartel Subsidiary Claims, the Post-Cartel Parent’s Claims and the December 1999 Parent Claims, including, but not limited to, interrupting the applicable limitation period and the filing of proceedings.
Governing law and jurisdiction
12. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of the Netherlands. (…)”.
2.26.
Verder heeft Equilib documentatie (‘Annexen’ of ‘Proof of Authority’ (PoA)) in het geding gebracht ter onderbouwing van de vertegenwoordigingsbevoegdheid van de personen die de cessiedocumentatie namens de cedenten hebben ondertekend (hierna ook: de bevoegdheidsdocumentatie).
2.27.
De op 30 september 2016 door A. Casanova (CEO) en C. Figueiredo (General Counsel & Company Secretary) namens cedent Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA ondertekende ‘Annex’ luidt bijvoorbeeld als volgt:
“(…) Statement
The undersigned hereby confirm(s) that Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA has been bound by the agreement(s) and assignment(s) listed under “Agreement(s) and Assignment(s)” from the date of their execution as set out therein and Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA wishes to remain bound by these agreement(s) and assignment(s).
Agreement(s) and Assignment(s)
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Supplementary assignment of rights agreement between Equilib, Unilever PLC/Unilever N.V. and Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA.
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Assignment from subsidiary to parent between Unilever PLC/Unilever N.V. and Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA.
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Intragroup assignment and mandate agreement between Equilib, Unilever PLC/Unilever N.V. and Unilever Jerónimo Martins LDA.”