Uitspraken

Bij Landsbesluit van 1 oktober 1996 is aan Cyberluck "gelet op artikel 2 van de Landsverordening buitengaatse hazardspelen (...) vergunning verleend voor het exploiteren van hazardspelen op de internationale markt door middel van servicelijndiensten (...)."

Cyberluck besteedt de exploitatie van haar vergunning deels aan anderen uit.

In de wandelgangen is Cyberluck een "master licence holder" gaan heten en dat deels uitbesteden van de exploitatie van de vergunning aan derden "sublicentië

ren".

appellante] heeft op 8 november 2021 publicaties met betrekking tot eisers op de website van KKC geplaatst. Deze droegen respectievelijk de titels: "Curacaose goksite witwasmachine drugsbende van "Dikke Piet" (hierna: publicatie 1), "[profvoetballer 1] en [profvoetballer 2] gehoord in megadrugszaak Piet S.: goksite lijkt link" (hierna: publicatie 2) en “[profvoetballer 1] en [profvoetballer 2] getuigen in drugszaak over online casino Edobet" (hierna: publicatie 3). De publicaties 1, 2 en 3 zullen samen worden genoemd: de publicaties.

In de publicaties is steeds de volgende tekst opgenomen:

"Van de voormalige Curacaose Edobet (FA entertainment NV), bestuurd door het Curacaose trustkantoor Pearl Trust en illegaal gesublicentieerd door licentie 1668/AZ Curacao Egaming (Cyberluck) vermoedt de Nederlandse justitie dat de site werd gebruikt als witwasvehikel voor een drugsorganisatie (KKC naschrift)".

“Van de voormalige Curacaose Edobet (FA entertainment NV), bestuurd door het Curacaose trustkantoor Pearl Trust en illegaal gesublicentieerd door licentie 1668/AZ Curacao Egaming (Cyberluck) vermoedt de Nederlandse justitie dat de site werd gebruikt als witwasvehikel voor een drugsorganisatie (KKC naschrift)”

en de navolgende rectificaties te plaatsen, naar inhoud en vorm op de volgende wijze:

(ii) In alle Publicaties, thans geplaatst onder de volgende URL's:

https: // knipselkrant-curacao.com/ media/ dossier-koninkrijksrelaties-nl/ / dkr-curacaose-goksite-witwasmachine-drugsbende-van-dikke-piet/

https:/ /knipselkrant-curacao.com/telegraaf-[profvoetballer 1]-en-[profvoetballer 2]-gehoord-in-megedrugszaak-piet-s-goksite-lijkt-link/

https: // knipselkrant-curacao.com/ media/ a I gemeen-nieuws/ casinonieuws-[profvoetballer 1]-en-[profvoetballer 2]-getuigen-in-drugszaak-over-online-casino-edobet/

en direct onder de titel de volgende tekst te plaatsen:

"RECTIFICATIE NA GERECHTELIJK BEVEL"

In de oorspronkelijke versie van deze publicatie, heb ik, [appellante], onderzoeksjournalist, ten onrechte gesteld dat het bedrijf Cyberluck (ook bekend als Curacao eGaming) onder leiding van haar directeur, [geïntimeerde 1], illegaal handelt door het uitgeven van zogenoemde sublicenties voor het aanbieden van kansspelen en dat het trustkantoor Pearl Trust en haar directeur [geïntimeerde 3] een illegale sublicentie zou uitbaten. Die stelling is niet gebaseerd op de feiten en daarmee onjuist en misleidend, nu de praktijk van sublicentiëren uitdrukkelijk niet verboden is. lk beveel aan dat andere media die dit bericht hebben overgenomen, deze rectificatie in hun berichtgeving (het gerecht leest:) overnemen."

en die rectificaties zodanig, dat zij te allen tijde bij opening van de voormelde publicaties zichtbaar zijn en blijven, zonder verder bijschrift, met hetzelfde lettertype en dezelfde lettergrootte, als gehanteerd in de publicatie 1, 2 en 3, voorzien van een zwart kader, waarbij, in het geval een of alle drie publicaties in het geheel worden verwijderd, de rectificaties desalniettemin beschikbaar dienen te blijven op de URL's waar respectievelijk de publicaties 1, 2 en 3 oorspronkelijk werden aangeboden, een en ander op straffe van een dwangsom van Naf 40.000,- voor iedere dag of gedeelte van een dag dat na betekening van dit vonnis niet of niet volledig aan dit bevel wordt voldaan, met een maximum van NAf 200.000,-;

Tegen deze door het Gerecht gegeven veroordelen richt zich het hoger beroep van [appellante].

Artikel 8 EVRM luidt:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the

law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the

country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection

of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms

of others.

Artikel 10 EVRM luidt:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right

shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart

information and ideas without interference by public authority

and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States

from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema

enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it

duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,

conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and

are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national

security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention

of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for

the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing

the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for

maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

In artikel 10 lid 2 EVRM is ‘the protection of the reputation (…) of others’ genoemd, maar daarmee wordt niet meer bedoeld dan de bescherming van ‘private life’ in artikel 8 EVRM. Zie de Grote Kamer van het Europese Hof voor de rechte van de mens (EHRM) op 29 maart 2016 (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0329) in de zaak Bédat v. Switzerland:

72. The Court reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915/01, § 70, ECHR 2004 VI; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147/06 § 40, 21 September 2010; and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 83). The concept of “private life” is a broad term which is not susceptible to exhaustive definition. (…). In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 83).

123. Bearing in mind the need to protect the values underlying the Convention and considering that the rights under Articles 10 and 8 of the Convention deserve equal respect, it is important to remember that the balance to be struck by national authorities between those two rights must seek to retain the essence of both (see also Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 110, ECHR 2015).

(a) Article 10 and press freedom

124. The Court has consistently held that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. As enshrined in Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 101, ECHR 2012; Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, § 88, ECHR 2015 (extracts); and Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 48, ECHR 2016).

125. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others, its task is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. The task of imparting information necessarily includes, however, “duties and responsibilities”, as well as limits which the press must impose on itself spontaneously (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 89; and Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 102).

126. The vital role of the media in facilitating and fostering the public’s right to receive and impart information and ideas has been repeatedly recognised by the Court. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role as “public watchdog” (see, recently, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 165, 8 November 2016, ECHR 2016; and further authorities).

127. Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that it is not for it, any more than it is for the national courts, to substitute its own views for those of the press as to what techniques of reporting should be adopted in a particular case (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298; and Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 146, ECHR 2007‑V).

128. Finally, it is well-established that the gathering of information is an essential preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of press freedom (see, most recently, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, cited above, § 130, with further references).

(b) Article 8, the right to privacy (…)

129. (…) the Court has constantly reiterated that the concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition (see S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, ECHR 2008; and Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland, no. 61838/10, § 52, 18 October 2016).

130. Leaving aside the numerous cases in which the Court has held that the right to privacy in Article 8 covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, private life has also been held to include activities of a professional or business nature (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251 B) or the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention (see Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 95, ECHR 2003 IX (extracts)).

131. Indeed, the Court has also held that there is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 83; and P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-IX).

132. The vast majority of cases in which the Court has had to examine the balancing by domestic authorities of press freedom under Article 10 and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention have related to alleged infringements of the right to privacy of a named individual or individuals as a result of the publication of particular material (see, for example, Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, no. 25576/04, 6 April 2010; and Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, no. 66456/09, 29 October 2013).

(…)

134. The fact that information is already in the public domain will not necessarily remove the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, §§ 74-75 and 77, ECHR 2004 VI), concerning the publication of photographs which had been taken in public places of a known person who did not have any official function, the Court found that the interest in publication of that information had to be weighed against privacy considerations, even though the person’s public appearance could be assimilated to “public information”.

135. Similarly, in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, cited above, §§ 176-178, central to the Court’s dismissal of privacy concerns was not the public nature of the information to which the applicant sought access, which is a factor to be considered in any balancing exercise, but rather the fact that the domestic authorities made no assessment whatsoever of the potential public-interest character of the information sought by the applicant in that case. (…).

5. Necessary in a democratic society

160. The core question in the instant case, as indicated previously, is whether the interference with the applicant companies’ right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society” and whether, in answering this question, the domestic courts struck a fair balance between that right and the right to respect for private life.

161. Having outlined above – see paragraphs 120-138 ‒ some general principles relating to the rights to freedom of expression and respect for private life, as well as why Article 8 of the Convention is clearly engaged in circumstances such as these, the Court considers it useful to reiterate the criteria for balancing these two rights in the circumstances of a case such as the present one.

(a) General principles concerning the margin of appreciation and balancing of rights

(…).

163. In cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court reiterates that the outcome of the application should not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who was the subject of the news report, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, as indicated previously, these rights deserve equal respect (see paragraph 123 above). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in principle be the same in both situations.

164. According to the Court’s established case-law, the test of necessity in a democratic society requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a pressing social need, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 62, Series A no. 30).

(…).

165. The Court has already had occasion to lay down the relevant principles which must guide its assessment – and, more importantly, that of domestic courts – of necessity. It has thus identified a number of criteria in the context of balancing the competing rights. The relevant criteria have thus far been defined as: contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, where it arises, the circumstances in which photographs were taken. Where it examines an application lodged under Article 10, the Court will also examine the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity, and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 93; Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, §§ 109-13; and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 90-95, 7 February 2012).

(…).

(b) Application of the relevant general principles to the present case

(i) Contribution of the impugned publication to a debate of public interest

167. There is, as the Court has consistently held, little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest (see Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV; and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V). The margin of appreciation of States is thus reduced where a debate on a matter of public interest is concerned (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 96, with further references).

168. In ascertaining whether a publication disclosing elements of private life also concerned a question of public interest, the Court has taken into account the importance of the question for the public and the nature of the information disclosed (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 98; and Von Hannover no. 2, cited above, § 109).

169. The public has a right to be informed, and this is an essential right in a democratic society which, in certain special circumstances, can even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures. However, articles aimed solely at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of a person’s private life, however well-known that person might be, cannot be deemed to contribute to a debate of public interest (see Von Hannover, cited above, § 65; MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 143, 18 January 2011; and Alkaya v. Turkey, no. 42811/06, § 35, 9 October 2012).

170. In order to ascertain whether a publication concerning an individual’s private life is not intended purely to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership, but also relates to a subject of general importance, it is necessary to assess the publication as a whole and have regard to the context in which it appears (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 102; Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway, no. 510/04, § 87, 1 March 2007; Björk Eiðsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 46443/09, § 67, 10 July 2012; and Erla Hlynsdόttir v. Iceland, no. 43380/10, § 64, 10 July 2012).

171. Public interest ordinarily relates to matters which affect the public to such an extent that it may legitimately take an interest in them, which attract its attention or which concern it to a significant degree, especially in that they affect the well-being of citizens or the life of the community. This is also the case with regard to matters which are capable of giving rise to considerable controversy, which concern an important social issue, or which involve a problem that the public would have an interest in being informed about. The public interest cannot be reduced to the public’s thirst for information about the private life of others, or to an audience’s wish for sensationalism or even voyeurism (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, §§ 101 and 103, and the further references cited therein).

(…)

(ii) Subject of the impugned publication and how well-known were the persons concerned

(…)

(iii) Manner of obtaining the information and its veracity

(…).

183. As to the manner in which the information was obtained, it is important to remember that, in the area of press freedom the Court has held that, by reason of the duties and responsibilities inherent in the exercise of the freedom of expression, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of public interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, cited above, § 159, with further references).

(…)

(iv) Content, form and consequences of the publication and related considerations

186. The Court has held, as indicated previously (see paragraph 127 above), that the approach to covering a given subject is a matter of journalistic freedom. It is for neither the Court nor the domestic courts, to substitute their own views for those of the press in this area (see Jersild, cited above, § 31; and Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 139). Article 10 of the Convention also leaves it to journalists to decide what details ought to be published in order to ensure an article’s credibility (see Fressoz and Roire, cited above, § 54; and ibid.). In addition, journalists enjoy the freedom to choose, from the news items that come to their attention, which they will deal with and how. This freedom, however, is not devoid of responsibilities (ibid.). The choices that they make in this regard must be based on their profession’s ethical rules and codes of conduct (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 138).

187. Where the impugned information was already publicly available, the Court has had regard to this factor in its assessment of whether the impugned restriction on freedom of speech was “necessary” for the purposes of Article 10 § 2. In some cases it has been a decisive consideration leading the Court to find a violation of the Article 10 guarantee (see Weber v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990, §§ 48-52, Series A no. 177; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, §§ 66-71, Series A no. 216; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, §§ 52-56, Series A no. 217; and Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, §§ 41-46, Series A no. 306-A) while in others, notably regarding the freedom of the press to report on public court proceedings, the fact that the information was in the public domain was found to be outweighed by the need to protect the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention (see Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, no. 34438/04, §§ 62-63, 16 April 2009; and Shabanov and Tren v. Russia, no. 5433/02, §§ 44-50, 14 December 2006).

(…).

(v) Gravity of the sanction imposed on the journalists or publishers

(…).

[p. 5]

What started out as a good and simple idea, turned out to be quite an adventurous journey. Little did I know then about the tremendous hurdles we were about to face along the way. After some peculiar stumbling blocks in the beginning, I was recommended to read a certain book and found the following quote:'

"The Netherlands comes equipped with built-in island laundromats - Aruba, Sint Maarten and Curacao - and the Dutch speak English. Best of all, lax Dutch law means even if they get caught, there isn't much anybody could do."

Jeffrey Robinson - The Sink: Crime, terror and dirty money in the offshore world (2003)

From here on, pieces began falling into place. Political policies and media strategies started to make more sense looking at my beloved little countries through the eyes of narco, maffia and financial offshore families. To offer a truly objective, reliable and independent online news, discussion and archive platform, I had to adapt a more critical media vision towards shadow economies like our Dutch notorious drugs trade history and worldchampion tax paradise business model.

As Holland nowadays operates as the narcocapital of Europe, whilst managing the biggest tax haven on earth, is there a money laundring link?

Organised crime Inc.

As a Dutch Kingdom affairs blogger, I became concerned about the abuse of our Dutch Kingdom islands in the Caribbean as a hub for corporate service providers with mainly Dutch backgrounds, managing international organised crime through anonymous shell companies, trustcompanies and taxrulings, misusing tax treaties/rulings, weak supervision, lack of regulation and almost absence of financial law enforcement to harbour the world's biggest offshore online gambling network of thousands of online gambling websites as a sophisticated money laundering, terrorism finance and underground banking infrastructure. And also with the tremendous amounts and suffering of it's victims, both direct and indirect. (…).

[p. 7-8]

Although nowhere officially registrated, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is presently home to an estimated 4000-5000 sublicensed offshore online gaming websites, many thousands of offshore gambling terminals and telecom (sms) lotteries from Dutch Caribbean datacenters to the rest of the world.

Designed by some of the world's largest trustcompanies and accountantsfirm's, and promoted by Dutch and Antilles goverments the unregulated Dutch-Antillean offshore online gaming, moneylaundering and underground banking infrastructure provides other trustcompanies, banks, fintechs, creditcardcompanies, corporate lawoffices, payment service providers, pensionfunds and hedgefunds access to hunderds of billions of unregulated narcocapital among thousands of billions illegal gambling declarations of origins (illegal gaming sublicensens) through offshore online casino's. Per annum. For more than 25 years now. Listen to BBC radioreporter [naam] how he exposed the bare essence of this criminal-financial network: the illegal master-sublicense infrastructure.

In short: with almost an absence of functioning regulation, financial supervision and law enforcement on the Dutch islands in the midst of a narco-region, the same taxhaven infrastructure setup for legitimate multinationals is also utilized by criminal organizations to launder narcocapital, managed by the same trust companies and related corporate service providers.

(…) we exposed trustcompany CEO's, accountantfirm partners, bankers, financial, tax, legal and payment services providers, linking top level government officials to the world's most powerful narco's and maffioso's and their corporate services providers, as their 'clientele' cannot operate without the support of government officials, bureaucrats, politicians, police, prosecuting and intelligence officers. Together they created the world's largest and unregulated criminal-financial offshore online gambling empire by abusing the Kingdom's extensive Double Taxation Treaty (DTT) network between the Netherlands, the European Union and beyond for preventing double taxation for multinationals, doubling as the world's most advanced underground banking, money laundring and terrorisme finance infrastructure for organized crime. At heart by supplying criminal organisations with anonymous tax-avoidance corporate constructions including illegal and unregulated online gaming sublicenses and state-owned, E-zone licensed telecominfrastructures to circumvent AML/CFT/KYC standards, to ensure dirty money ending up offshore in international banks and hedgefunds. Basically hiding in plain sight. In 2019, the Britsh Broadcasting Company (BBC) exposed the missing money laundering link.

Media

(…)

And yes, as a team we succeeded making knipselkrant-curacao.com the most popular Dutch online daily newsclippings & discussion and archive platform from the heart of the Caribbean. Currently with a pageview average of appr.140.000 per day. (…)

In de eerste plaats immers kunnen overwegingen van zedelijke, religieuze of culturele aard, die bij loterijen evenals bij andere kansspelen in alle Lid-Staten een rol spelen, niet buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. In het algemeen leiden zij ertoe, dat de beoefening van kansspelen wordt beperkt zo niet verboden, en dat wordt voorkomen dat kansspelen een bron van individueel profijt vormen. Voorts moet worden opgemerkt, dat loterijen, gezien de grote bedragen die ermee kunnen worden ingezameld en de winsten die zij de spelers kunnen bieden, vooral wanneer zij op grote schaal worden georganiseerd, aanzienlijke gevaren voor criminaliteit en fraude met zich meebrengen. Zij zijn ook een aansporing om geld te verkwisten, hetgeen schadelijke individuele en maatschappelijke gevolgen kan hebben. Ten

slotte mag niet over het hoofd worden gezien dat, ofschoon dit op zich geen objectieve rechtvaardiging vormt, loterijen in belangrijke mate kunnen bijdragen tot de financiering van onbaatzuchtige activiteiten of activiteiten van algemeen belang, zoals maatschappelijk werk, liefdadigheidswerken, sport of cultuur. .

Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.

There is, as the Court has consistently held, little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions (…) on debate on matters of public interest.

Beslissing

Het Hof:

Dit vonnis is gewezen door mrs. G.C.C. Lewin, C.G. ter Veer en J. de Boer, leden van het Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten en van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba en ter openbare terechtzitting van het Hof in Curaçao uitgesproken op 11 oktober 2022 in tegenwoordigheid van de griffier.